Supreme Court of Maryland Upholds Child Victims Act of 2023 Which Removes Statute of Limitations for Child Sexual Abuse Cases in Maryland.

02/19/2025

“Is the retroactive elimination of
time restrictions applicable to child sexual assault claims contained in the
Child Victims Act of 2023 constitutional as applied to the defendants?”

        This was the question presented to
the Supreme Court of Maryland in its September 2024 session.  In three separate cases, numerous adult
plaintiffs filed claims of child sexual abuse that had been previously time
barred before October 1, 2023. 
Nonetheless, due to the passage of the Child Victims Act of 2023, these
plaintiffs filed child sexual abuse claims in state and federal courts in
Maryland.  The cases were: (1) Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Washington v. John Doe, et al, Case No.
C-16-CV-24-004497; (2) Board of Education of Harford County, et al. v. John
Doe, Case No.: C-12-CV-23-000767; and (3) The Key School, Inc., et al. v.
Valerie Bunker, Case No.: 1:23-cv-02662-MJM. 
The three cases were consolidated and brought before the Supreme Court
of Maryland to answer the following certified question, “Does the Maryland
Child Victims Act of 2023, 2023 Md. Laws Ch. 5 (S.B. 686) (codified at Md. Code
Ann., Cts & Jud. Proc. § 5-117), constitute an impermissible abrogation of
a vested right in violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
and/or Article III, Section 40 of the Maryland Constitution?” 

        In order to determine whether or not
the 2023 Child Victims Act (“2023 Act”) abrogated vested rights of the
defendants in the three consolidated cases, the Court went through a multi-step
analysis to determine whether two identical bills from 2017, 2017 Md. Laws,
Chs. 12 & 656 (“2017 Act”), the Child Victims Act’s predecessor,
retroactively abrogated vested rights. 
More specifically, the opinion focused on: (1) whether subsection (d) of §
5-117 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article was a statute of
limitations or a statute of repose; and (2) whether the running period of
either type of statute established a vested right in a defendant to be from of
liability from a cause of action.

        Statutes of limitations and statutes
of repose are two types of statutes that consist of time-based restrictions
that can bar proceeding on a cause of action. 
While these statutes have some overlapping features that cause much
confusion, they can also be distinguished very easily. 

        A statute of limitations is more of
a remedial or procedural vehicle “designed to: (1) provide adequate time for
diligent plaintiffs to file suit, (2) grant repose to defendants when
plaintiffs have tarried for an unreasonable period of time, and (3) serve
society by promoting judicial economy.” Pennwalt Corp. v. Nasios, 314
Md. 433, 437-38 (1988).  While the word
repose is used in describing the purpose of a statute of limitations, these
types of statutes “do not create any substantive rights in a defendant to be
free from liability.” Anderson v. United States, 427 Md. 99, 118
(2012).  Statutes of limitations are
understood to bar a plaintiff from a remedy for enforcing a right, rather than
extinguishing the right itself. Park Plus, Inc. v. Palisades of Towson, LLC,
478 Md. 35, 54 (2022).  These statutes
are plaintiff-focused, triggered by the occurrence or discovery of an injury,
and allow for tolling for minors to reach the majority age, 18, and for
fraudulent concealment. Anderson, 427 Md. At 118.

        A statute of repose achieves the
same objectives as a statute of limitations but for a different purpose.  These defendant-focused statues provide an
absolute bar to a cause of action and provide immunity to a class of
particularized defendants after a designated time period has passed. Id.  These statutes are triggered by some
unrelated “event, act, or omission” and are not subject to rolling. Id.
at 118-119.  Statutes of repose “create[]
a substantive right [which] protects a defendant from liability.” Id. at
120. 

        The next question the Court had to
analyze was whether either time restriction created a vested right to be free
from liability upon the extinguishment of a certain period of time.  To answer this question, the Court had to
establish, first, what a vested right was. 
A vested right was defined to be one “so far perfected that it cannot be
taken away by statute” and could be protected “from legislative interference.” Langston
v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 419-20 (2000). 
Additionally, in reference to the certified question brought before the
Court, it has been previously held that “the Constitution of Maryland prohibits
legislation which retroactively abrogates vested rights.” Dua v. Comcast
Cable of Maryland, Inc., 370 Md. 604, 623 (2002).  In terms of a statute of limitations, the Court
concluded that there was no such vested right to be abrogated upon a revival of
a claim that is time-barred by an ordinary statute of limitations.  However, when it came to statutes of repose,
the Court found that the expiration of time in such a statute created a vested
right in a defendant.

        Ultimately, in this instant case,
the Court found that the plain language of subsection (d) of § 5-117, as it was
in 2017, was more akin to a statute of limitation rather than a statute of
repose, and as such, did not grant the defendants in the three consolidated
cases any vested right to be free from liability.  The Court analyzed the purpose, operation,
trigger, and uncodified features of subsection (d) to come to the foregoing
conclusion.  The Court also relied on the
statutory and legislative history of the statute to determine the General
Assembly’s intent for subsection (d) to be a statute of limitations.  Therefore, the above-referenced certified
question was answered in the negative.

        While both Justice Biran and
Justice McDonald wrote dissenting opinions regarding the Court’s majority
decision in this matter, I do find the 2023 Child Victims Act to be an
inspiring piece of legislation that not only prevents perpetrators and
non-perpetrators from escaping liability, but it allows persons who were
sexually abused as children to take the time they need in digesting what
happened to them. 

- Aaminah Woods, Associate